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Abstract
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over
the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place,
to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the vot-
ers’ rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what con-
ditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a
consequence of the pre-vote phase.
1 Introduction
Group decision-making is a topic of increasing relevance for Artificial Intelligence
(AI). Addressing the problem of how groups of self-interested, autonomous entities
can take the ‘right’ decisions together is key to achieve intelligent behaviour in sys-
tems dependent on the interaction of autonomous entities. Against this backdrop, social
choice theory has by now become a standard tool in the toolbox of AI and, especially,
multi-agent systems (henceforth, MAS), see, e.g., (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008;
Brandt et al., 2016). Voting in particular has been extensively studied as a prominent
group decision-making paradigm in MAS. Despite this, only a small and very recent
body of literature (Desmedt and Elkind, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2010; Obraztsova et al.,
2013; Elkind et al., 2015) is starting to focus on voting as a form of strategic, non-
cooperative, interaction.
∗This paper improves and extends work previously presented at the 24th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’15) (Grandi et al., 2015). The paper has benefited from the feedback of the
anonymous reviewers at IJCAI’15, COMSOC’14 and LOFT’14. The authors are greatly indebted to Edith
Elkind and Ulle Endriss for valuable comments on earlier versions of this work, and to the participants of
the Second International Workshop on Norms, Actions and Games (NAG’16) in Toulouse, the 2015 LABEX
CIMI Pluridisciplinary Workshop on Game Theory in Toulouse, the 5th International Workshop on Com-
putational Social Choice (COMSOC’14) in Pittsburgh, the 11th Conference on Logic and the Foundations
of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT’14) in Bergen, the 12th Meeting of the Social Choice and Welfare
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More specifically—and this is the focus of the current contribution—no work with
the notable exception of the literature on iterative voting (Meir et al., 2010), (Xia and Conitzer,
2010),(Lev and Rosenschein, 2012),(Braˆnzei et al., 2013),(Meir et al., 2014),(Lev and Rosenschein,
2016) has ever studied how voting behavior in rational agents is influenced by strategic
forms of interaction that precede voting—like persuasion, or negotiation. Literature in
social choice has recognised that interaction preceding voting can be an effective tool to
induce opinion change and achieve compromise solutions (Dryzek and List, 2003; List,
2011) while in game theory pre-play negotiations are known to be effective in overcom-
ing inefficient outcomes caused by players’ individual rationality (Jackson and Wilkie,
2005).
1.1 Rational, Truthful, but Inefficient Votes
Consider a multiple referendum, where a group of voters cast yes/no opinions on a
number of issues, which are then aggregated independently in order to obtain the
group’s opinion on those issues. An instance of this situation is represented in the
following table:
issue 1 issue 2 issue 3
voter 1 1 0 0
voter 2 0 1 0
voter 3 0 0 1
Majority 0 0 0
where three voters express their binary opinions on each of three issue (1 for accep-
tance, 0 for rejection), which are aggregated one by one using the majority rule. Voters
typically approach such a referendum with some preference over its outcomes. So, to
continue on the example above, let us assume that each voter i is interested in having
the group accept issue i. Given these goals, it is rational for each voter to cast a truth-
ful vote, that is a vote in which each voter i accepts issue i: if the voter is not pivotal
(that is, it belongs to a minority), its vote will not count, but if it is pivotal, casting a
truthful vote will make its own opinion become majority. The example—which is also
an instance of the so-called Ostrogorski paradox (Anscombe, 1976; Daudt and Rae,
1976)—shows a situation in which truthful voting leads to an inefficient majority. That
is, a majority that rejects all issues and in so doing fails to meet the goal of each voter.
Importantly, in the example there are a number of truthful profiles that would lead to
an efficient majority (e.g., the profile where each voter accepts every issue). This is a
deep tension within (binary) voting: when sincere voting is rational (weakly dominant)
it may turn out to be inefficient. As we will see, this is not a feature of the major-
ity rule alone, but of a large class of well-behaved aggregation rules. Understanding
mechanisms which can resolve such inefficiencies is, we argue, an important step to-
wards the development of human-level group decision-making capabilities in artificial
intelligence.
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1.2 Contribution & Scientific Context
In this paper we study pre-vote negotiations in voting games over binary issues, where
voters hold a simple type of lexicographic preference over the set of issues: they hold an
objective about a subset of them while they are willing to strike deals on the remaining
ones. Voters can influence one another before casting their ballots by transferring utility
in order to obtain a more favourable outcome in the end. We show that this type of pre-
vote interaction has beneficial effects on voting games by refining their set of equilibria,
and in particular by guaranteeing the efficiency of truthful ones. Specifically, we isolate
precise conditions under which ‘bad’ equilibria—i.e., truthful but inefficient ones—can
be overcome, and ‘good’ ones can be sustained. Our work relates directly to several
on-going lines of research in social choice, game theory and their applications to MAS.
Binary Aggregation Aggregation and merging of information is a long studied topic
in AI (Konieczny and Pino Pere´z, 2002; Chopra et al., 2006; Everaere et al., 2007) and
judgment aggregation has become an influential formalism in AI (Endriss, 2016). This
setting is also known as voting in multiple referenda (Lacy and Niou, 2000). Binary
voting can be further enriched by imposing that individual opinions also need to satisfy
a set of integrity constraints, like in binary voting with constraints (Grandi and Endriss,
2013) and judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List, 2007a; Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014).
Standard preference aggregation, which is the classical framework for voting theory,
is a special case of binary voting with constraints (Dietrich and List, 2007a). Voting
with constraints will be touched upon towards the end of the paper. Research in bi-
nary voting and judgment aggregation focused on the (non-)manipulability of judgment
aggregation rules (Dietrich and List, 2007c; Botan et al., 2016) and its computational
complexity (Endriss et al., 2012; Baumeister et al., 2015), but a fully-fledged theory of
non-cooperative games in this setting has not yet been developed and that is our focus
here.
Election Control The field of computational social choice has extensively studied
decision problems involved with various forms of election control (see (Faliszewski and Rothe,
2016), for a recent overview) such as: lobbying (Christian et al., 2007; Bredereck et al.,
2014), bribery (Baumeister et al., 2015; Hazon et al., 2013), modelled from the single
agent perspective of a lobbyist or briber who tries to influence voters’ decisions through
monetary incentives, or from the perspective of a coalition of colluders (Bachrach et al.,
2011). Here we study a form of control akin to bribery, but where any voter can ’bribe’
any other voter. Our work can be seen as an effort to develop a fully fledged game-
theoretic model of this type of control. Our focus is on equilibrium analysis and we
therefore sidestep issues of computational complexity in this paper.
Equilibrium refinement Non-cooperative models of voting are known to suffer from
a multiplicity of equilibria, many of which appear counterintuitive, not least because
of their inefficiency. Equilibrium selection or refinement is a vast and long-standing
research program in game theory (Meyerson, 1978). Models of equilibrium refinement
have been applied to voting games in the literature on economics (Gueth and Selten,
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1991; Kim, 1996) and within MAS especially within the above-mentioned iterative
voting literature (Desmedt and Elkind, 2010; Obraztsova et al., 2013, 2015), which of-
fers a natural strategy for selecting equilibria through the process of best response dy-
namics that starts from a profile of truthful votes. Our model tackles the same issue of
refinement of equilibria in the context of binary voting, and focusing on those equilib-
ria that are truthful and efficient. Unlike in iterative voting, our model is a two-phase
model where equilibria are selected by means of an initial pre-vote negotiation phase,
followed by voting.
Boolean Games We model voting strategies in binary aggregation with a model that
generalises the well-known boolean games (Harrenstein et al., 2001; Wooldridge et al.,
2013): voters have control of a set of propositional variables, i.e., their ballot, and have
specific goal outcomes they want to achieve. In our setting the goals of individuals
are expressed over the outcome of the decision process, thus on variables that—in non
degenerate forms of voting—do not depend on their single choice only. Unlike boolean
games, where each actor uniquely controls a propositional variable, in our setting the
control of a variable is shared among the voters and its final truth value is determined
by a voting rule. A formal relation with boolean games will be provided towards the
end of the paper.
Pre-play Negotiations We model pre-vote negotiations as a pre-play interaction phase,
in the spirit of (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005). During this phase, which precedes the play
of a normal form game—the voting game— players are entitled to sacrifice part of their
final utility in order to convince their opponents to play certain strategies, which in our
case consist of voting ballots. In doing so we build upon the framework of endogenous
boolean games (Turrini, 2016), which enriches boolean games with a pre-play phase.
We abstract away from the sequential structure of the bargaining phase, modelled in
closely related frameworks (Goranko and Turrini, 2016).
1.3 Outline of the Paper
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the setting of binary aggre-
gation, defining the (issue-wise) majority rule as well as general classes of aggregation
procedures, which constitute the rules of choice for the current paper. In Section 3 we
define voting games for binary aggregation, specifying individual preferences by means
of both a goal and a utility function, and we show how undesirable equilibria can be
removed by appropriate modifications of the game matrix. In Section 4 we present a
full-blown model of collective decisions as a two-phase game, with a negotiation phase
preceding voting. We show how the set of equilibria can be refined by means of ratio-
nal negotiations. Section 5 relaxes assumptions we make on voters’ goals in the basic
framework showing the robustness of our results. Section 6 discusses related work in
some more detail. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
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2 Preliminaries: Binary Aggregation
The study of binary aggregation dates back to (Wilson, 1975), and was recently revived
both within economics (Dokow and Holzman, 2010) and AI (Grandi and Endriss, 2013).
This section is a brief introduction to the key notions and definitions of the framework.
2.1 Basic Definitions
In binary aggregation a finite set of agents (to which we will also refer as voters and,
later on, players) N = {1, . . . , n} express yes/no opinions on a finite set of binary
issues I = {1, . . . ,m}, and these opinions are then aggregated into a collective deci-
sion over each issue. This is analogous to voting over a simple (binary) combinatorial
domain (Lang and Xia, 2016). Issues can be seen as queries to voters in a multiple
referendum (Lacy and Niou, 2000), or seats that need to be allocated to candidates—
two per seat—in assembly composition (Benoˆit and Kornhauser, 2010), or candidates
of which voters approve or disapprove of (Brams and Fishburn, 1978).
In this paper we assume that |N | ≥ 3, i.e., there are at least 3 individuals. We
denote with D = {B | B : I → {0, 1}} the set of all possible binary opinions over
the set of issues I and call an element B ∈ D a ballot. B(j) = 0 (respectively,
B(j) = 1) indicates that the agent who submits ballot B rejects (respectively, accepts)
the issue j. A profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) is the choice of a ballot for every individual
in N . Given a profile B, we use Bi to denote the ballot of individual i within a profile
B. We adopt the usual convention writing −i for N\ {i} and thus B−i to denote
the sequence consisting of the ballots of individuals other than i. Thus, Bi(j) = 1
indicates that individual i accepts issue j in profile B. Furthermore, we denote by
NBj = {i ∈ N | Bi(j) = 1} the set of individuals accepting issue j in profile B.
Given a set of individuals N and issues I, an aggregation rule for N and I is
a function F : DN → D, mapping every profile to a binary ballot in D, called the
collective ballot. F (B)(j) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the value of issue j in the aggregation of
B via aggregator F .
The benchmark aggregation rule is the so-called issue-wise strict majority rule,
which we will refer to simply as (issue-wise) majority (in symbols, maj). The rule
accepts an issue if and only if a majority of voters accept it, formally maj(B)(j) = 1
if and only if |NBj | ≥
|N |+1
2
. Other examples of aggregation rules include quota
rules, which accept an issue if the number of voters accepting it exceeds a given quota,
possibly different for each issue. Formally, if a quota rule Fq is defined via a function
q : I → {0, 1, . . . , n}, associating a quota to each issue, by stipulating Fq(B)j =
1 ⇔ |NBj | ≥ q(j). Fq is called uniform in case q is a constant function. Issue-wise
majority is a uniform quota rule with q = ⌈N+1
2
⌉
. A third class of rules are distance-
based rules, which output the ballot that minimises the overall distance to the profile
for a suitable notion of distance.1
Table 1 depicts a ballot profile with three agents (rows A,B and C) on three issues
(columns p, q and r) and the aggregated ballot (fourth row) obtained by majority.
1See (Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014) and (Endriss, 2016) for a more detailed exposition of aggregation rules.
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p q r
A 1 0 1
B 1 1 0
C 0 0 0
maj 1 0 0
Table 1: An instance of binary aggregation
2.2 Classes of Aggregators
The vast majority of the results we present in this paper are formulated and proved with
respect to classes of aggregators, rather than specific aggregators like majority. The
classes we consider are standard in the literature that focuses on binary aggregation
from an axiomatic standpoint. The following are the properties we will be working
with.2
Definition 1. An aggregator F is said to be:
independent if for any issue j ∈ I and any two profiles B,B′ ∈ D, if Bi(j) = B′i(j)
for all i ∈ N , then F (B)(j) = F (B′)(j);
neutral if for any two issues j, k ∈ I and any profile B ∈ D, if for all i ∈ N we have
that Bi(j) = Bi(k), then F (B)(j) = F (B)(k);
responsive if for any issue j ∈ I there exist two profilesB andB′ such thatF (B)(j) =
1 and F (B′)(j) = 0;
monotonic if for any issue j ∈ I, x ∈ {0, 1} and any two profiles B,B′ ∈ D, if
Bi(j) = x entails B′i(j) = x for all i ∈ N , and for some ℓ ∈ N we have that
Bℓ(j) = 1− x and B′ℓ(j) = x, then F (B)(j) = x entails F (B
′)(j) = x.
anonymous if for any two players i, j ∈ N and any two profiles B,B′ ∈ D, if
Bi = B
′
j , B
′
i = Bj and, for each k ∈ N \ {i, j}, we have that Bk = B′k, then
F (B) = F (B′).
dictatorial (a dictatorship) on issue j, if there exists i ∈ N such that for any profile B,
F (B)(j) = Bi(j). A dictatorship is an aggregator that is dictatorial on every
issue.
Furthermore, an aggregator is said to be systematic if it is both independent and neu-
tral.
An aggregator is independent if the decision of accepting a given issue j does not
take into consideration the judgment of the individuals on any issue other than j.3 It
2We refer the reader to the relevant literature mentioned in the introduction for more information about
the axiomatic method in binary and judgment aggregation.
3When the aggregator is independent, the process of aggregation is also referred to as proposition-wise
voting in the literature on multiple referrenda (Ozkai-Sanver and Sanver, 2006), or seat-by-seat voting in the
literature on assembly composition (Benoˆit and Kornhauser, 2010), or as simultaneous voting in the literature
on voting over combinatorial domains (Lang and Xia, 2016).
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is responsive if it is not a constant function. It is monotonic if increasing the support
for a collective ballot on one issue does not modify the result. It is neutral if all issues
are treated in the same way, and anonymous if all voters are treated in the same way. It
is systematic if it is both independent and neutral. Finally, an aggregator is dictatorial
if whenever a designated individual accepts an issue, that issue is also collectively
accepted and vice versa.
The majority rule, like any uniform quota rule, satisfies systematicity, monotonic-
ity and anonymity. Non-uniform quota rules satisfy independence, monotonicity and
anonymity, but fail neutrality (and hence systematicity). The minority rule, i.e., the rule
that always selects the opposite of the majority rule, satisfies independence, anonymity,
neutrality, but fails monotonicity. Dictatorships are (trivially) systematic and mono-
tonic, but obviously not anonymous.
In this paper we will especially focus on independent, monotonic and anonymous
aggregators, swapping whenever possible independence with systematicity in order to
obtain stronger results.
2.3 Winning and Veto Coalitions
Given an aggregator F , we call a set of voters C ⊆ N a winning coalition for issue
j ∈ I if for every profile B we have that if Bi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ C and Bi(j) = 0 for
all i 6∈ C then F (B)(j) = 1.4 The notion of winning coalition is closely related to the
independence property defined above:5
Fact 1. An aggregator F is independent iff for all j ∈ I there exists a set of subsets
Wj ⊆ P(N ) such that, for each ballot B, F (B)j = 1 if and only NBj ∈ Wj . I.e.,
F is independent iff it can be defined in terms of a family {Wj}j∈I of sets of winning
coalitions.
Furthermore, we call a set of voters C ⊆ N a veto coalition for issue j ∈ I if for
every profile B we have that if Bi(j) = 0 for all i ∈ C and Bi(j) = 1 for all i 6∈ C
then F (B)(j) = 0. Clearly,
C ∈ Wj IFF N\C 6∈ Vj . (1)
Observe that by the above relation and Fact 1 an independent aggregator can equiva-
lently be defined by a set {Vj}j∈I of veto coalitions, consisting of exactly the com-
plements of those coalitions that do not belong to any Wj . If we want to make ex-
plicit the underlying aggregator we sometimes write WF (respectively, VF ) for the
set of winning (resp., veto) coalitions for F . Let us fix intuitions by a few examples.
The sets of winning and veto coalition for issue-wise majority are, for every issue j:
Wj =
{
C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ |N |+1
2
}
and Vj =
{
C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ |N |
2
}
. When |N | is odd,
this is the only quota rule for which Wj = Vj (so-called unbiasedness). For a constant
4The definitions from this section are all standard, except for the notion of resilient coalitions treated
below. See, for instance, (Dokow and Holzman, 2010) (Dokow and Holzman, 2010).
5This and the following facts are assumed to be well-known, for a proof in the setting of judgment
aggregation we refer to Endriss (Endriss, 2016), Lemma 17.1.
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aggregator which always accepts all issues, that is, a quota rule with q = 0, the sets
of winning and veto coalitions are, for each issue j: Wj = 2N , i.e., any coalition is
winning, and Vj = ∅, i.e., no coalition is a veto coalition.
Additional properties imposed on an independent aggregatorF induce further struc-
ture on winning (and veto) coalitions:
Fact 2. An independent aggregator F is neutral (and hence systematic) iff for each
j, k ∈ I we have that Wj = Wk (equivalently, Vj = Vk for all j, k ∈ I). An
independent aggregator F is monotonic iff for each j ∈ I and for any C ∈ Wj
(respectively, C ∈ Vj), if C ⊆ C′ then C′ ∈ Wj (respectively, C′ ∈ Vj), i.e., winning
(and veto) coalitions are closed under supersets. An independent aggregator F is
anonymous iff for each j ∈ I we have that C ∈ Wj implies that D ∈ Wj whenever
|C| = |D|, i.e., coalitions are winning only depending on their cardinality.
We conclude this preliminary section with one last important definition. We call C
a resilient winning coalition (respectively, a resilient veto coalition) for issue j ∈ I
if C is a winning (resp., veto) coalition for j and, for every i ∈ C, C \ {i} is also a
winning (resp., veto) coalition for j.6 For every issue j, the set of resilient winning
(resp., veto) coalitions for j is denoted W+j (resp., V+j ). Given a neutral aggregator
F , we denote with W (resp., V) the set of winning (resp., veto) coalitions for F , and
with W+ (resp., V+) the set of resilient winning (resp., veto) coalitions for F . Again
if we want to make the underlying aggregator explicit, we write W+F (resp., V+F ) for
the set of resilient winning (resp., veto) coalitions for F . For example, in the case
of the majority rule we have W+maj =
{
C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ |N |+1
2
+ 1
}
, i.e., all winning
coalitions exceeding the majority threshold of at least one element are resilient winning
coalitions. For a uniform quota rule Fq , the set of resilient winning coalitions isW+Fq =
{C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ q + 1}. Observe also that if F is dictatorial, then W+F = ∅.
3 Games for Binary Aggregation
In this section we present a model of a strategic interaction played by voters involved
in a collective decision-making problem on binary issues. Players’ strategies consist
of all binary ballots on the set of issues, and the outcome of the game is obtained by
aggregating the individual ballots by means of a given aggregator. Players’ preferences
are expressed in the form of a simple goal that is interpreted on the outcomes of the
aggregation (i.e., the collective decision), and by an explicit payoff function for each
player i, yielding to i a real number at each profile and encoding, intuitively, the mate-
rial value i would receive, should that profile of votes occur. We study the existence of
equilibria of these games, paying particular attention to the truthful and efficient ones.
6This definition adapts the notion of resiliency of equilibria studied by (Halpern, 2011) to the notion of
winning and veto coalition proper of binary aggregation.
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3.1 Main Definitions
Before defining aggregation games we need a last piece of notation. To each set of is-
sues I, we associate the set of propositional atoms PS =
{
p1, . . . , p|I|
}
containing one
atom for each issue in I. We denote with LPS the propositional language constructed
by closing PS under a functionally complete set of boolean connectives (e.g., {¬,∧}).
3.1.1 Aggregation Games, Goals and Preferences
Definition 2. Let I and N be given. An aggregation game (for I and N ) is a tuple
A =
〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {πi}i∈N
〉
where:
• F is an aggregator for N and I;
• each γi is a cube, i.e. a conjunction of literals from LPS,7 which is called a goal;
• πi : DN → R is a payoff function assigning to each strategy profile a real
number representing the utility that player i gets at that profile.
Note that a strategy profile in an aggregation game is a profile of binary ballots, and
will therefore be denoted with B. In the context of aggregation games we will use the
term “strategy profile” and “ballot profile”, or even just “profile”, interchangeably.
Goals, intuitively, represent properties of the outcome of the aggregation process
that voters are not willing to compromise about. By making the assumptions that goals
are cubes we assume that each voter has a simple incentive structure: she can identify
a specific set of atoms that she wants to be true at the outcome, another set of atoms
that she wants to be false, and she is indifferent about the value of the others. When
comparing two outcomes, one of which satisfies her goal and one of which does not, a
voter will choose the outcome satisfying her goal. Thus, the first degree of preference
of agents is dichotomous (Elkind and Lackner, 2015). If then two outcomes both sat-
isfy her goal, or both do not, then the voter will look at the value she obtains at those
outcomes through her payoff function.
This, we argue, is a very natural class of preferences for binary aggregation. They
are technically known as quasi-dichotomous preferences (Wooldridge et al., 2013)
and widely studied in the context of boolean games. Henceforth we employ the sat-
isfaction relation |= (respectively, its negation 6|=) to express that a ballot satisfies (re-
spectively, does not satisfy) a goal. The preference relation induced on ballot profiles
by goals and payoff function is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Quasi-dichotomous preferences). Let A be an aggregation game. Ballot
profile B is strictly preferred by i ∈ N over ballot profile B′ (in symbols, B ≻πi B′)
if and only if any of the two following conditions holds:
i) F (B′) 6|= γi and F (B) |= γi;
ii) F (B′) |= γi iff F (B) |= γi, and πi(B) > π′i(B).
7Formally, each γi is equivalent to
∧
j∈K ℓj where K ⊆ I and ℓj = pj or ℓj = ¬pj for all j ∈ K .
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The two ballots are equally preferred whenever F (B′) |= γi iff F (B) |= γi, and
πi(B) = π
′
i(B). The resulting weak preference order among ballot profiles is denoted
πi .
In other words, a profile B is weakly preferred by player i to B′ if either F (B)
satisfies i’s goal and F (B′) does not or, if both satisfy i’s goal or neither do, but B
yields to i at least as good as payoff as B′. Individual preferences over ballot profiles
are therefore induced by their goals, by their payoff functions, and by the aggregation
procedure used.
Finally, goals relate in a clear way to the structure of winning and veto coalitions of
an independent aggregator. One can identify for every goal which are the sets of agents
that can force the acceptance of such goal:
Definition 4. For an independent aggregatorF and a cube γ we say that C is winning
for γ if and only if C ∈ Wj for each j such that γ |= pj , and C ∈ Vj for each j such
that γ |= ¬pj .8 We write Wγ for the set of winning coalitions for γ. The set of resilient
winning coalitions for γ (denoted W+γ ) is defined in the obvious way.
In words, a coalition is winning for a goal whenever it is winning for all the issues
that need to be accepted for γ to be satisfied, and veto for all the issues that need to be
rejected for γ to be true. An obvious adaptation of the definition yields the notion of
veto coalition for a given goal which, however, we will not be using in this work.
3.1.2 Classes of Aggregation Games
A natural class of aggregation games is that of games where the individual utility only
depends on the outcome of the collective decision:
Definition 5. An aggregation game A is called uniform if for all i ∈ N and profiles
B it is the case that πi(B) = πi(B′) whenever F (B) = F (B′). A game is called
constant, if all πi are constant functions, i.e., for all i ∈ N and all profiles B we have
that πi(B) = πi(B′).
Clearly, all constant aggregation games are uniform. Games with uniform payoffs
are arguably the most natural examples of aggregation games. The payoff each player
receives is only dependent on the outcome of the vote, and not on the ballot profile that
determines it. For convenience, we assume that in uniform games the payoff function
is defined directly on outcomes, i.e., πi : D → R. Constant games are games where
players’ preferences are fully defined by their goals, and are therefore dichotomous.
We call a strategy B i-truthful if it satisfies the individual’s goal γi. Note that in
the case in which γi is a cube that specifies in full a single binary ballot—that is, the
agent’s goal is a ballot—our notion of truthfulness coincides to the classic notion used
in judgment aggregation and binary voting where only one ballot is truthful, and all
other ballots are available for strategic voting.
Let us introduce some further terminology on strategy profiles:
8Symbol |= is here used as logical entailment between two formulas.
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Definition 6. Let C ⊆ N . We call a strategy profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn):
(1) C-truthful if all Bi with i ∈ C are i-truthful, i.e., Bi |= γi, for all i ∈ C;
(2) C-goal-efficient (C-efficient) if F (B) |= ∧i∈C γi;9
(3) totally C-goal-inefficient (totally C-inefficient) if F (B) |= ∧i∈C ¬γi.
Observe that while the notion of truthfulness is a property of the ballot itself, with
goals interpreted on the individual ballots to check for truthfulness, the two notions of
efficiency are instead properties of the outcome of the aggregation. One of the main
problems that will be encountered in the following sections is indeed the existence
of truthful weakly dominant profiles that are however aggregated in totally inefficient
outcomes.
One last piece of notation: let us call a game C-consistent, for C ⊆ N , if the con-
junction of the goals of agents in coalition C is consistent, i.e., if the formula∧i∈C γi
is satisfiable.
3.2 Equilibria in Aggregation Games
In this section we study Nash equilibria (NE) in special classes of aggregation games
(that is, those that are constant and uniform) and their properties. Our focus is the
existence of ‘good’ NE, that is, NE that are truthful and efficient.
3.2.1 Absence of Equilibria
First of all, it is important to observe that aggregation games may not have, in general,
(pure stragegy) NE.
Fact 3. There are aggregation games that have no NE.
Proof. Define an aggregation game as follows. Let I = {p}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and let
γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = ⊤. Assume also that the payoff function is defined as follows: for
any ballot profile B, we have that π1(B) = 1 if and only if B1 = B2, and 0 otherwise;
π2(B) = 1 if and only if B1 6= B2, and 0 otherwise; finally, π3 is constant. That is,
agent 1 wants 1 and 2 to agree on issue p while agent 2 wants them to disagree, and
agent 3 is indifferent among any two outcomes of the interaction.10 It is easy to see
that the aggregation game encodes a matching-pennies type of game between 1 and 2
and, therefore, the resulting aggregation game does not have a NE.
We will come back to the issue of the absence of NE in Section 4.
9Observe that since each γi is a cube, also
∧
i∈C γi is a cube.
10Note that this game is not uniform.
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3.2.2 Equilibria in Constant Aggregation Games
Recall that a strategy Bi is weakly dominant for agent i if for all profiles B we have
that (B−i, Bi) πi B. We begin with an important result providing sufficient condi-
tions for truthful strategies in a constant aggregation game to be weakly dominant.
Proposition 4. Let A be a constant aggregation game with F independent and mono-
tonic, and let i ∈ N be a player. If a strategy Bi is truthful then it is weakly dominant
for i.11
Proof. Let Bi be a truthful strategy, i.e., Bi |= γi. We want to show that Bi is weakly
dominant, that is for every B′ ∈ DN , F (B′) |= γi implies F (B′−i, Bi) |= γi. We
proceed towards a contradiction and assume that, for some profile B′ we have that
F (B′) |= γi and F (B′−i, Bi) 6|= γi. Since by Definition 2 individual goals are cubes,
we have that γi =
∧
j∈I ℓj , where ℓj is a literal built from PS. Hence there exists a k ∈
I such thatF (B′−i, Bi) 6|= ℓk butF (B′) |= ℓk. Assume w.l.o.g. that ℓk is positive, i.e.,
ℓk = pk. Since Bi is assumed to be truthful, Bi |= ℓk (that is, Bi(k) = 1). Now, F is
independent so the value of issue k in the output of F depends only on the values of k in
each individual ballot in the input profile. Moreover, since F (B′) |= ℓk and Bi |= ℓk,
by the monotonicity of F we conclude that F (B−i, Bi) |= ℓk. Contradiction.
Intuitively the proposition tells us that independent and monotonic aggregators, as
far as only the satisfaction of individual goals is concerned, guarantee that players
are always better off by casting a truthful ballot. A first immediate consequence is
that computing weak dominant strategies in constant aggregation games is polynomial,
since it boils down to finding a satisfying assignment to the individual goal, which in
our model is a conjunction of literals. Other consequences are stated in the following
corollary:
Corollary 5. Let A be an aggregation game with F independent and monotonic:
(i) any profile B such that Bi |= γi for all i ∈ N is a NE;
(ii) if for all i ∈ N the formula γi is consistent, then A has at least one NE.
The converse of Proposition 4 can be obtained for stronger but still natural assump-
tions, providing sufficient conditions for weakly dominant strategies to be truthful.
Proposition 6. LetA be a constant aggregation game with F independent, monotonic,
responsive and anonymous. Then all weakly dominant strategies for i ∈ N are truthful.
Proof. Consider a weakly dominant strategy Bi for i, and assume towards a contra-
diction that Bi 6|= γi, i.e., Bi is not truthful. Since goals are cubes, there exists a k
such that Bi 6|= ℓk, where γi =
∧
j∈I ℓj . W.l.o.g., assume that ℓk = pk and let us
argue towards the acceptance of k. By responsiveness there exist B and B′ such that
F (B)(k) = 1 and F (B′)(k) = 0. By anonymity, collective acceptance and rejection
11This proposition can also be obtained as corollary of a result by (Dietrich and List, 2007c). We are
indebted to Ulle Endriss for this observation.
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of k depends only on the cardinality of the set of agents accepting k in a given profile.
So, by monotonicity there exists an integer q ( 6= 0, by responsiveness) such that F
accepts k if and only if the cardinality of the set of agents accepting k is at least q.12
Therefore there exist B and B′ such that F (B)(k) = 1 and F (B′)(k) = 0 and such
that B−i = B′−i and Bi(k) = 1 6= B′i(k). Furthermore, exploiting independence, let
us assume that for any j 6= i and t 6= k, Bj(t) = B′j(t) and F (B) |= γi. That is, there
exist two profiles such that the first satisfies i’s goal and the second does not, because
the first meets the threshold for accepting k while the second does not. And the reason
for the second not meeting the threshold is i’s ballot to reject k. In other words, i is
pivotal in B′ for the acceptance of k and therefore for the acceptance of its goal. It
follows that for any strategyB′i such that B′i |= ℓk we have that F (B−i, B′i) |= γi, i.e.,
Bi is dominated by B′, against the assumption that Bi is weakly dominant in A.
Bundling Propositions 4 and 6 together we thus obtain conditions over the aggrega-
tor (independence, monotonicity, responsiveness and anonymity) that imply the equiv-
alence of truthfulness and weak dominance in constant aggregation games. As noted in
the proof of Proposition 6, these conditions on the aggregator force it to be a quota rule
(with non-0 quota). The equivalence of truthfulness and weak dominance is therefore
a feature of an important class of well-behaved aggregators.
Before concluding this section, it should be stressed that Proposition 4 ceases to
hold if we allow the goals of the voters to be propositional formulas more complex
than a cube:
Example 1. Let F = maj, N = I = {1, 2, 3} and let I = {1, 2}. Let then γ1 =
p1 ∨ p2 and γ2 = γ3 = ⊤. That is, agent 1 is interested in having at least one of
the two issues accepted, while the rest of the agents are indifferent. We show that in
this game not all all truthful ballots of 1 are weakly dominant. Consider the profile
B = (B1, B2, B3) where 1 votes the truthful ballot B1 = (0, 1), 2 votes B2 = (0, 0)
and 3 votes B3 = (1, 0). We have that F (B) 6|= γ1. Clearly, 1 has a best response
B′1 = (1, 0) 6= B1 in that profile as F (B′1, B2, B3) |= γ1.
Example 2. Let F = maj, N = I = {1, 2, 3} and let agent 1’s goal be that of
having an odd number of accepted issues, while agents 2 and 3 have no specific goals.
Formally, let γ1 = (p1∧p2∧p3)∨(p1∧¬p2∧¬p3)∨(¬p1∧p2∧¬p3)∨(¬p1∧¬p2∧p3).
As above we show that not all all truthful ballots of 1 are weakly dominant. Consider
the profile B = (B1, B2, B3) where B2 = (1, 0, 0) and B3 = (0, 1, 0) and where 1
votes a truthful ballot B1 = (0, 0, 1). This profile results under the majority rule in
(0, 0, 0). So the (non-truthful) ballot B′1 = (1, 0, 1) 6= B1 is a better response in B for
1 and yields the collective ballot (1, 0, 0), which satisfies γ1.
In fact, cubes guarantee that players’ preferences in constant aggregation games
satisfy a property known as separability (cf. (Lang and Xia, 2016) for separability in
combinatorial domains), which has been shown in other voting frameworks to guaran-
tee that truthful strategies are undominated (Benoˆit and Kornhauser, 2010).13
12Readers acquainted with judgment and binary aggregation will have noticed we are working here with
the class of quota rules with non-trivial quota. Cf. (Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014).
13Separability is normally defined over strict orders (but cf. (Hodge, 2002) for a general treatment of the
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3.2.3 Truthfulness and Efficiency
Proposition 4 establishes the existence of truthful equilibria. However, as we already
noticed in the introduction of this paper, truthfulness does not guarantee efficiency.
And this does not only hold for constant aggregation games based on majority, but for
games based on a large class of aggregators—known to correspond to the class of all
possible uniform quota rules14—as the following result shows.
Proposition 7. For every aggregator which is anonymous, systematic and monotonic,
there exist constant aggregation games with truthful and totally inefficient NE in weakly
dominant strategies.
Proof. The proof is by construction of a constant aggregation gameA with the desired
property. Let F be anonymous, systematic and monotonic, let N = I = {1, 2, 3}.
First we will construct two games and show that at least one of the two admits a truthful
and totally inefficient profile. We can then apply Proposition 4 to show that such profile
ought to be a NE in weakly dominant strategies. The games are built on the same
aggregator F and differ only on their goals. Game A Let, for each i ∈ N , γi = pi.
Each γi is therefore, trivially, a cube. Note also that
∧
i∈N γi is satisfiable, so Game A
is N -consistent. Game B Let, for each i ∈ N , the goal be defined as χi = ¬pi. Each
χi is therefore, again, a trivial cube and Game B is also N -consistent. Now construct
a ballot profile B in Game A and a ballot profile B′ in Game B as follows, for i ∈ N
and j ∈ I:
Bi(j) =
{
1 if pj = γi
0 otherwise B
′
i(j) =
{
0 if ¬pj = χi
1 otherwise (2)
That is, in B each voter votes 1 only on the issue which coincides with its goal. Vice
versa, in B′ each voter votes 0 only on the issues whose rejection coincides with its
goal. By construction, B and B′ are both truthful. Now assume that B is not totally
inefficient, and we prove that B′ is totally inefficient. So there exists i ∈ N such that
F (B) |= γi and since by construction γi = pi, F (B)(i) = 1. By anonymity and
systematicity, B must actually be efficient, that is F (B) |=
∧
i∈N γi as by construc-
tion the individual positions on each issue are identical, modulo permutations. More
precisely, by construction for all j 6= i ∈ N , Bj(pi) = 0, that is, i is the only voter
accepting pi in B. By independence and monotonicity it follows that {i} ∈ Wpi , that
is, if i accepts pi so does F . However, {i} 6∈ Vpi for otherwise i would be a dictator
for pi, against the assumption of anonymity for F . From {i} 6∈ Vpi and Equation (1)
it follows that N\ {i} ∈ Wpi from which we obtain that F (B′)(pi) = 1 and hence
that F (B′) |= ¬χi. By the anonymity and systematicity of F it therefore follows
that F (B′) |=
∧
i∈N ¬χi as by construction the individual positions on each issue are
identical, modulo permutations. B′ is therefore a truthful but totally inefficient ballot
notion). In our setup separability can be defined as follows: i is separable if and only if for all j ∈ I , if
B i B
′ for two profiles such that F (B)(k) = F (B′)(k) for all k 6= j, then B′′ i B′′′ for all profiles
such that F (B′′)(k) = F (B′′′)(k) for all k 6= j and F (B)(j) = F (B′′)(j). If i is a dichotomous
preference induced by a cube (i.e., a conjunction of literals), then i is separable for the above definition.
14See (Dietrich and List, 2007b), Theorem 1.
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profile. Since B′ is, by construction, a profile where each voter is truthful, by Proposi-
tion 4, B′ is also a NE in weakly dominant strategies. This completes the proof.
3.2.4 Equilibria in Uniform Aggregation Games
Since constant payoffs are special cases of uniform ones, negative results such as
Proposition 7 still hold for uniform aggregation games. As to truthful voting, Proposi-
tion 4 does not generalise to uniform aggregation games:
Proposition 8. There exist uniform aggregation games for maj in which truthful strate-
gies are not dominant.
Proof. Define the uniform aggregation game as follows. Let I = {p, q, t}, N =
{1, 2, 3} and F = maj. Let γ1 = ¬p∧q∧¬t, γ2 = ¬p∧¬q∧¬t, and γ3 = ¬p∧¬q∧t.
Define the payoff functions as follows, let πi(B) = 1 for i = 3 and B = (0, 1, 0), and
0 otherwise. Take the following profiles: B1 = ((0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)) and B2 =
((0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)). Since maj(B1) = (0, 0, 0) and maj(B2) = (0, 1, 0), we
have B2 ≻π3 B1 and B1, unlike B2, contains a truthful strategy by 3.
The fact that truthful voting is not always a dominant strategy for aggregation
games with simple goals might seem counterintuitive, especially when the payoff is
required to be uniform across profiles leading to the same outcome. The reason for this
lies in the effect of the payoff function. When a player is in the position of changing
the outcome of the decision in a certain profile, this does not necessarily imply she has
the power to make the collective decision satisfy her goal. She may only be able to lead
the group to a decision which, even though still not satisfying her goal, yields a better
payoff for her.
Despite the negative result in Proposition 8, we can still prove the existence of
truthful and efficient equilibria in a uniform aggregation game if we assume the mutual
consistency of the individual goals of a resilient winning coalition.
Proposition 9. Every C-consistent uniform aggregation game for F independent and
monotonic has a NE that is C-truthful and C-efficient, if C ∈ W+∧
Γ
where Γ =
{γi | i ∈ C}.
Proof. Take a C-consistent uniform aggregation game. Notice that since each goal γi
is a cube, also
∧
Γ is a cube, so that Definition 4 applies. There exists then a ballot B∗
such that B∗ |=
∧
Γ. Take now any ballot profile B∗ such that B∗ is the ballot of all
and only the voters in C while all agents in N\C vote the inverse ballot B∗ (that is,
for any issue j, B∗(j) = 1 iff B∗(j) = 0). Since C ∈ W∧Γ (by the assumption that
C ∈ W+∧
Γ
) we have that F (B∗) = B∗. Clearly F (B∗) satisfies the conjunction of the
goals of the individuals in C, and each individual in C votes truthfully. We show that
B
∗ is a NE, by showing that (a) no agent inN\C has a profitable deviation, and (b) no
agent in C has a profitable deviation. As to (a), since F is monotonic, any change in
the ballot B∗(j) by some voter in N\C does not change the outcome F (B∗) = B∗.
As to (b), any change in the ballotB∗ by some voter in C does not change the outcome
because C ∈ W+∧
Γ
.
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Let us recapitulate the findings of this section. We have shown, for a well-behaved
class of aggregators, that aggregation games with constant payoffs have many NE, since
the truthful ballots are exactly the weakly dominant strategies of the game (Propositions
4 and 6). This result does not carry over to uniform aggregation games, but we showed
that with some stronger assumptions on the aggregator, the existence of truthful and
efficient equilibria in such games can be guaranteed each time a resilient winning coali-
tion has non-conflicting goals (Proposition 9). Proposition 7 has then highlighted a key
issue of aggregation games: truthful equilibria may be totally inefficient in the sense of
failing to satisfy the goals of all voters, even when all such goals are consistent. The
purpose of the following section is to introduce an endogenous pre-play negotiation
mechanism which, in equilibrium, allows players to select truthful and efficient NE of
the underlying aggregation game, thus resolving the tension between truthfulness and
efficiency.
4 Pre-vote Negotiations
The section presents endogenous aggregation games, our model aggregation games
augmented with a pre-vote negotiation phase. In a nutshell voters will now be allowed,
before the vote takes place, to sacrifice a part of their expected gains in order to influ-
ence the other voters’ decision-making. We show that allowing such negotiations: (i)
guarantees the selection of efficient equilibria for all individuals when one such equi-
librium exists (ii) discards all equilibria that are inefficient for the voters of any winning
coalition.
4.1 Endogenous Aggregation Games
Endogenous aggregation games consist of two phases:
• A pre-vote phase, where, starting from a uniform aggregation game, players
make simultaneous transfers of utility that may modify each others’ payoffs in
the game;
• A vote phase, where players play the aggregation game resulting from the origi-
nal game after payoffs are updated according to the tranfers made in the pre-vote
phase.
As usual, it is assumed that the players have common knowledge of the structure of
the game (including their goals and payoffs). A key assumption is furthermore that
the transfers made in the pre-vote phase be binding, for instance through a central
authority.15 The authority would, besides running the election in the vote phase, also
collect and enforce the transfers announced in the pre-vote phase.
Pre-vote strategies are modelled as transfer functions of the form:
τi : D
N ×N → R+
15The existence of such authority is a common assumption in work on election control and bribing
(Faliszewski and Rothe, 2016), as well as persuasion (Hazon et al., 2013). It is often referred to as ‘chair’ or
‘election organiser’.
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where i ∈ N . These functions encode the amount of payoff that player i commits to
give to player j should a given ballot profile B be played, in symbols, τi(B, j). The
set of all transfer functions is denoted by T , and a transfer profile is a tuple of transfer
functions τ ∈ T |N |. We denote with τ0 the ‘void’ transfer where at every profile every
player gives 0 to the other players.
The aggregation game induced by the transfer profile τ from A is denoted τ(A) =〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {τ(π)i}i∈N
〉
where, for any i ∈ N :
τ(π)i(B) = πi(B) +
∑
j∈N
(τj(B, i)− τi(B, j)) (3)
So the payoff of player i at profile B once τ is played, consists of the old payoff that i
was receiving at B, plus the money that i receives from the other players at B, minus
what i gives to them at B. Notice that transfers do not preserve the uniformity of
payoffs: even thoughA is always assumed to be uniform, τ(A) is not necessarily so,16
and may lack a NE (recall Proposition 3).
Endogenous aggregation games are defined formally as follows:
Definition 7 (Endogenous aggregation games). An endogenous aggregation game is a
tuple AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉 where A is a uniform aggregation game, and for each i ∈
N , Ti = T . A constant endogenous aggregation game is an endogenous aggregation
game AT where A is assumed to be constant.17
In an endogenous aggregation game, each player i selects first a transfer τi (pre-
vote phase). The resulting transfer profile τ yields the new aggregation game τ(A).
Then each player selects a ballot Bi (vote phase) in τ(A). The resulting ballot profile
B yields the collective ballot F (B), where F is the aggregator of A.
4.2 Equilibrium Selection via Pre-vote Negotiations
In this section we first provide the definition of the solution concept we use for analysing
endogenous games as two-stage extensive form games, and we then present our main
results on the selection of efficient equilibria via pre-vote negotiations.
4.2.1 Solving Endogenous Aggregation Games
Endogenous aggregation games are (perfect information) extensive form games with
two stages of simultaneous choices. So in an endogenous aggregation game, a strategy
of player i is a function σi that selects a τi in the pre-vote phase, and a ballot Bi in ev-
ery aggregation game reachable in the voting phase of the endogenous game. A profile
σ of such strategies selects a unique transfer profile and a ballot profile—transfer-
ballot profile in short—(τ,B) that will be played if that strategy profile is chosen by
the players. It is fundamental to notice how each strategy profile determines not only
16In fact it is easy to see that there always exists a transfer that turns a uniform aggregation game into a
non uniform one.
17Constant endogenous aggregation games will be discussed in Section 5.
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what will be played after a given transfer profile, i.e., the choices on the equilibrium
path, but also what would be played after all other possible transfer profiles, i.e., the
counterfactual choices off the equilibrium path. Given the above, it would seem natural
to resort to (pure strategy) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) to solve endoge-
nous aggregation games. There is a complication however. As we observed earlier, the
aggregation game resulting from a transfer profile may not be uniform and, therefore,
may not necessarily have a NE. This makes SPE inapplicable as some subgames of
the initial extensive game may, therefore, be unsolvable. Also notice how resorting
to mixed strategy equilibria would not be a fix, as lexicographic preferences are well-
known not to be representable in terms of a utility functions, therefore not enabling
Nash’s NE existence theorem (Rubinstein, 2012).
What we do instead is to analyse endogenous aggregation games by assuming that,
if the game resulting from a transfer profile does not have a NE, players play a maxmin
strategy and resort to their maxmin value, or security level,18 to evaluate the resulting
aggregation game. 19 In our quasi-dichotomous setup a maxmin strategy (ballot) is
defined as:
argmax
pii
Bi
min
pii
B
−i
{F (B) | B = (Bi,B−i)} , (4)
i.e., the ballot that maximises the minimum, with respect toπi (Definition 3), outcome
for i. If the maxmin strategy Bi guarantees that γi is satisfied no matter what the other
players do, then we say that Bi is safe for γi. The minimum payoff guaranteed by
a i’s maxmin strategy is i’s security level. We can now define the solution for an
endogenous aggregation game.
Definition 8 (Solutions). Let AT be an endogenous aggregation game. A strategy
profile σ of AT is a solution of AT if and only if:
(1) Voting phase. At each τ(A) with τ ∈ T , σ induces a NE of τ(A), if such
equilibrium exists, or a profile of maxmin strategies of τ(A), otherwise.
(2) Negotiation phase. σ selects a unique transfer profile τ , and this profile is a
NE of the game 〈N , {Ti}i∈N , {πi }i∈N 〉 where Ti = T and each πi ⊆ T 2 is
the quasi-dichotomous preference20over transfer profiles where τ πi τ ′ if either
the outcome of τ(A) satisfies i’s goal and the outcome of τ ′(A) does not, or i’s
payoff is greater at the outcome of τ(A) than at the outcome of τ ′(A).21
18See (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008) (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008) for an extensive exposition
of the notion.
19A game with no NE should be seen as an unstable game, i.e., a situation in which the players do not
have any reason to believe that some specific outcome will be realised. Measures such as the security level
therefore compensate for this uncertainty. We could have adopted a number of alternative solutions, e.g.,
taking the value of the minimum outcome for each player, or considering such games never to be profitable
deviations. Ultimately, all these assumption have the effect of ruling out profitable deviations to games with
no NE.
20Recall Definition 3.
21Formally: a profile τ with associated ballot B by strategy profile σ satisfies goal γi (τ |= γi) if either
B is a NE of τ(A) and B |= γi, or Bi is safe for γi in τ(A), where B is the ballot profile induced by σ,
and Bi is i’s maxmin strategy. The payoff πi of profile τ is either τ(π)i(B) if B is a NE, or i’s security
level in τ(A) otherwise, where B is the ballot profile induced by σ.
18
A transfer-ballot profile (τ,B) is called a solution outcome of AT iff it is induced by
some solution of AT .
Intuitively, a solution outcome is obtained as follows:
• Voting phase In the aggregation game resulting after each transfer profile, a NE
is selected where at least one such equilibrium exists, or a maxmin profile is
selected otherwise; the value of such NE, if it exists, or the players’ security
levels are used to evaluate transfer profiles in the next phase;
• Negotiation phase A transfer profile is selected, such that no profitable deviation
exists to another transfer profile, for any player, given the selected continuations.
The definition of solutions is an adaptation to endogenous aggregation games of the
classical backwards induction procedure used to calculate subgame perfect equilibria
in extensive games, and therefore gives a procedural recipe to compute them.
4.2.2 Surviving Equilibria
This section provides existence results for solutions of endogenous games. We actually
provide stronger results, showing not only that solutions exist, but also (in the next
sections) necessary and sufficient conditions for them to enjoy desirable properties in
terms of the ‘quality’ of the equilibria that negotiation gives rise to. In other words, we
study endogenous aggregation games as endogenous mechanisms for the refinement of
the equilibria of their underlying aggregation games.
Definition 9. LetA be a uniform aggregation game, andB a NE ofA. B is a surviving
Nash equilibrium (SNE) of A if there exists a transfer profile τ such that (τ,B) is a
solution outcome of the endogenous aggregation game AT .
Intuitively, surviving SNE identify those voting outcomes that can be rationally
sustained by an appropriate pre-vote negotiation. Clearly, not all NE of the initial
game will be surviving equilibria but, crucially, it can be shown that NE with good
properties are of this kind, as we set out to show in this section. Let us first establish
the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let A be a uniform aggregation game for an independent and monotonic
aggregator F . Then, for every N -efficient and N -truthful ballot profile B of A, there
exists a transfer profile τ such that B is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium in
τ(A).
Proof. Let B be a N -efficient and N -truthful ballot profile of A. We construct a
transfer profile τ such that for any i ∈ N the strategy Bi is a strictly dominant strat-
egy for i in τ(A), that is: for any profile B′, (Bi,B′−i) πi B
′ and for some B′,
(Bi,B
′
−1) ≻
π
i B
′
. The construction goes as follows.22 Consider now the quantity:
M = 1 +max
({
z | ∃B,B′and i ∈ N s .t . z = πi(B)− πi(B
′)
}) (5)
22The construction is based on a similar construction developed in (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005, Th. 4).
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that is, M exceeds by one unit the maximal difference between the payoff received at
any two outcomes by any agent. We are now ready to define a transfer function. For
all i, j ∈ N :
τi(B
′, j) =
{
2M if B′i 6= Bi
0 otherwise.
(6)
In words, each player i commits to pay each other player the sum 2M in case he de-
viates from the ballot Bi. By the definition of the preference relation πi (Definition
3), in order to prove the claim we need to show that: A For any B′ if F (B′) |= γi
then F (Bi,B′−i) |= γi, that is, under no circumstance i’s goal would become falsi-
fied by playing Bi. B For any B′ if F (B′) |= γi iff F (Bi,B′−i) |= γi (that is
both profiles satisfy i’s goals), then τ(π)i(Bi,B′−i) ≥ τ(π)i(B′), and for some B′,
τ(π)i(Bi,B
′
−i) > τ(π)i(B
′).
Claim A Assume that F (B′) |= γi. There are two cases. First, B′i |= γi. Since
B is N -truthful we know that Bi |= γi. Now γi is assumed to be a cube (Definition
2) so B′i and Bi can differ only on the evaluation of issues on which the truth of γi
does not depend. By the independence of F we conclude that F (Bi,B′−i) |= γi.
Second, B′ 6|= γi. But, as above, Bi |= γi. By the assumption F (B′) |= γi, so in
profile (Bi,B′−i) voter i is changing the evaluation of at least one of the atoms that
was falsifying γi in B′i (recall that γi is a cube) to the evaluation given by F (B′). By
the monotonicity of F we can therefore conclude that F (Bi,B′−i) |= γi.
Claim B Given the definition of payoffs in endogenous games (3), the claim fol-
lows directly from the construction of τ . This completes the proof.
Intuitively, the lemma establishes that whenever a truthful profile exists that satis-
fies all players’ goals, that profile can be turned into a dominant strategy equilibrium
by means of a suitable combination of pre-vote transfers which, in essence, make the
players’ commitment to that equilibrium credible.
4.2.3 Good Equilibria Survive
Lemma 10 establishes the existence of a suitable transfer profile sustaining ‘good’—
that is, truthful and efficient—equilibria. We now show that there exist solutions of
the endogenous aggregation game which require precisely the transfer profile from
Lemma 10 to be played in the negotiation phase of the game, and which therefore
determine the voters to play ‘good’ equilibria in the voting phase.
Theorem 11. LetA be a uniform aggregation game for an independent and monotonic
aggregator F . Every N -efficient and N -truthful NE of A is a SNE.
Proof. Let B be a N -efficient and N -truthful NE of A. By the assumptions on the
aggregator and Lemma 10, we can construct a transfer profile τ according to Formula
(6) such that B is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of τ(A). We have to show
that (τ,B) is a solution outcome of AT . Suppose towards a contradiction that this is
not the case, that is, that there exists a profitable deviation by player i from the strategy
profile that induces the transfer-ballot profile (τ,B). Since B is a dominant strategy
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equilibrium in τ(A) such deviation has to involve a different transfer τ∗i by player i in
the pre-vote phase. We identify two cases:
Case 1 The deviation induces a new transfer profile τ ′ = (τ∗i , τ−i) such that
τ ′(A) has no NE. By Definition 8 a deviation to τ∗i would yield i his security level in
τ ′(A). We show that τ πi τ ′, and hence the deviation cannot be profitable for i. Since
B |= γi we have, by Definition 8, that if τ ′ |= γi then τ |= γi, that is, it cannot be the
case that τ ′ leads i to satisfy its goal while τ does not. As to the payoffs, observe that
πi(τ) is the payoff yielded by the NE B of τ(A), and that given the construction of τ ′
no agent transfers any utility to i in τ ′: for all j ∈ N \ {i}, τ ′j(B
′, i) = 0 whenever
B′j = Bj . It follows that for every ballot profile B
′ in τ ′(A) i’s payoff is at most as
much as what it obtains from B in τ(A). Hence, τ πi τ ′.
Case 2 The deviation induces a new transfer profile τ ′ = (τ∗i , τ−i) such that the
game τ ′(A) has a NE. We show that τ∗i cannot be a profitable deviation for i. Since the
strategy profile supporting (τ,B) is assumed to be a solution, i’s deviation determines
a transfer-ballot profile (τ ′,B′) where B′ may or may not be a NE. However, if i’s
deviation toward (τ ′,B′) where B′ is not a NE is profitable, i must have another
at least as profitable deviation determining the transfer-ballot profile (τ ′, (B∗i ,B
′)),
where (B∗i ,B
′) is a NE of τ ′(A). We therefore assume w.l.o.g., that the transfer-ballot
profile (τ ′,B′) determined by i’s deviation is such that B′ is a NE of τ(A). Observe
now that in order for (τ ′,B′) to be profitable for i there must exist a j 6= i such that
B′j 6= B, that is, there exists at least another agent j besides i who deviates from B
to B′. This is because B is an N efficient NE and by construction of τ ′,we have that
τ ′j(B
′, i) = 0 whenever B′j = B. So let there be k ≥ 1 players j 6= i for which
B′j 6= B and consider some such j. We have two subcases:
Case 2a B′ 6|= γj . Note that since B′ is a NE, we have that no B′′j is such that
F (B′′j ,B
′
−j) |= γj , so B
′
j is a best response only by virtue of j’s payoff. By the
construction of τ ′, playing B′j gives j the following payoff:
τ ′(π)j(B
′) = πj(B
′)− (|N | − 1)2M + 2M(k − 1) + τ ′i(B
′, j).
If j plays Bj instead, then j’s payoff is:
τ ′(π)j(Bj ,B
′
−j) = πj(Bj ,B
′
−j) + 2M(k − 1) + τ
′
i(Bj ,B
′
−j , j).
Now since B′ is a NE by assumption and j does not have a better response that can
satisfy her goal, we have that τ ′(π)j(B′) ≥ τ ′(π)j(Bj ,B′−j) and therefore:
τ ′i(B
′, j)− τ ′i(Bj ,B
′
−j, j) ≥ πj(Bj ,B
′
−j)− πj(B
′) + (|N | − 1)2M.
Now we use this inequality to compare i’s payoff in (τ,B) vs. (τ ′,B′). Given the
definition of M in Formula (5) and given the fact that |N | − 1 ≥ 2 it follows that
τ ′i(B
′, j)− τ ′i(Bj ,B
′
−j , j) ≥ 3M , which in turn implies that τ ′i(B
′, j) ≥ 3M . There-
fore i’s payoff τ ′(π)i(B′) in the new NE B′ is at most:
πi(B
′)− k3M + k2M.
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In contrast, by the construction of τ in Formula (6), τ(π)i(B) = πi(B). So from the
fact that k ≥ 1 it follows that πi(B′) − k3M + k2M ≤ πi(B) and therefore that
τ ′(π)i(B
′) ≤ τ(π)i(B). Since B is N -efficient, by Definition 8, τ πi τ ′ and the
constructed deviation τ∗i cannot be profitable.
Case 2b F (B′) |= γj . Notice that from this it follows that F (Bj ,B′−j) |= γj ,
for otherwise there would be a ballot profile (i.e., (Bj ,B′−j)) where B′j is a better
response for j making γj true. From this we would conclude that B in τ(A) would
not be a dominant strategy equilibrium, against our assumption. We can then proceed
as in Case 2a, showing that τ ′(π)i(B′) ≤ τ(π)i(B). Since, as just noticed, both B
and B′ satisfy γj , by Definition 8, τ πi τ ′ and the constructed deviation τ∗i cannot be
profitable. This completes the proof.
By combining Theorem 11 with Proposition 9, we also get the following corollary:
Corollary 12. LetF be an independent and monotonic aggregator. EveryN -consistent
uniform aggregation game for F , where N ∈ W+∧
Γ
with Γ = {γi | i ∈ N}, has a SNE
that is N -truthful and N -efficient.
4.2.4 Only Good Equilibria Survive
We now turn to necessary conditions for equilibria to survive, and observe that for an
equilibrium to survive, it has to be efficient. This can be regarded as a converse state-
ment of Theorem 11, and it holds true in a general form concerning winning coalitions
(and not just the coalition N ) with internally consistent goals:
Theorem 13. Let A be a C-consistent uniform aggregation game for an independent
and monotonic aggregatorF , and such thatC ∈ W∧Γ where Γ = {γi | i ∈ C}. Then,
every SNE of A is C-efficient.
Proof. We proceed by contraposition. Let B be a NE that is not C-efficient, i.e., such
that F (B) 6|= γi for some individual i ∈ C, and assume towards a contradiction that
B is a SNE. Therefore there exists a transfer profile τ such that (τ,B) is a solution
outcome of the endogenous game AT . We proceed towards a contradiction and con-
struct a profitable deviation for a player i from τ , that is a τ ′ such that τ ′ ≻πi τ . By
C-consistency of A there exists a ballot B′ such that B′ |=
∧
Γ, hence in particular
B′ |= γi. Let now i deviate to any transfer profile τ ′ = (τ ′i , τ−i) such that she offers to
all other players in C more than their payoff difference if they switch to vote for ballot
B′ while everybody else in C does so, i.e.,
τ ′i((B
′
C ,B
′′
−C), j) > τ(π)j(B
′
C−{j}, B
′′
j ,B
′′
−C)− τ(π)j(B
′
C ,B
′′
−C)
for each j ∈ C, each B′′j , and each B
′′
−C , and where B′C = (B′j)j∈C . By the fact
that B′ is C-efficient, F independent and monotonic, and C is a winning coalition for∧
Γ, this transfer makes each B′j , with j ∈ C a best response in profiles (B
′
C ,B
′′
−C),
for any B′′−C . It follows that each (B
′
C ,B
′′
−C) is a NE of τ ′(A), which satisfies
∧
Γ,
while B in τ(A) does not. We can therefore conclude (by Definition 8) that τ ′ ≻πi τ ,
completing the proof.
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The proof of Theorem 11 provides every agent with a simple algorithm to compute
a negotiation strategy that will guarantee the emergence of an efficient equilibrium
in the resulting game. Note that the use of cubes sidesteps the intractability of the
satisfiability problem for the conjunction of the goals.
Observe also that Theorem 13 implies the existence of uniform aggregation games
where no equilibrium is surviving, which in turn implies that Theorem 11 cannot be
weakened from N -efficiency to C-efficiency. This is the case when distinct but over-
lapping coalitions have incompatible goals, as the following example shows:
Example 3. Let there be five players in N , and let F be the majority rule. Let γ1 =
p∧¬r, γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = ⊤ and let γ5 = r ∧¬p. Both coalitions C1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
C2 = {2, 3, 4, 5} are resilient winning coalitions, and the game is both C1-consistent
and C2-consistent. Hence, by Theorem 13 any surviving equilibria must be both C1-
efficient and C2 efficient, which is impossible given that the conjunction of the goals of
the two coalitions is inconsistent.
4.2.5 Summary
Results such as Theorems 11 and 13 suggest that pre-vote negotiations are a powerful
tool players have to overcome the inefficiencies of aggregation rules. More specifi-
cally, when the goals of all players can be satisfied at the same time, pre-vote nego-
tiations allow players to engineer side-payments—essentially as devices for credible
commitments—leading to equilibrium outcomes that satisfy them, and ruling out all
the others. We stress that in solving endogenous aggregation games, even when the
game ends up sustaining efficient outcomes, players’ strategies are individually ratio-
nal and the game remains non-cooperative throughout. This differentiates our work
from approaches to equilibrium selection with coalitional games, such as the one de-
veloped by (Bachrach et al., 2011).
5 Larger Classes of Goals
In this section we explore two variants of our results where we relax the assumption
that goals need to be cubes. The section shows that our results about equilibrium
refinement via endogenous games are robust across different natural settings to model
strategic behaviour in binary aggregation.
5.1 Monotonic Goals
As shown in Examples 1 and 2, when goals are not cubes it is possible to construct
constant aggregation games in which truthful strategies are not dominant. In this sec-
tion we find sufficient conditions on the class of goals for which there exists a truthful
strategy that is weakly dominant, and we build further on this result by showing that,
in constant aggregation games where players’ goals are ‘aligned’ in a precise sense, we
can still construct a truthful NE that is also efficient (Theorem 16).
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Up until now we referred to aggregation games assuming players’ goals were cubes
(Definition 2). In this section we drop such constraint and, when referring to aggrega-
tion games, we will make explicit what type of goal formulas we are considering.
We first need some additional notation and a definition. Let B be a valuation over
PS, denote with B−j the restriction of B to PS \ {pj}.
Definition 10. A formula ϕ ∈ LPS is:
positively monotonic in pj , where pj occurs in ϕ, if for all B,B′ ∈ D such that
B |= ϕ, B−j = B′−j , and B′ |= pj then B′ |= ϕ.
negatively monotonic in pj if for all B,B′ ∈ D such that B |= ϕ, B−j = B′−j , and
B′ 6|= pj then B′ |= ϕ.
A formula ϕ is monotonic if for every pj occurring in ϕ, it is either positively or
negatively monotonic in pj .
Let us mention a few examples. Formulas that are satisfied by only one model
are monotonic. Similarly, cubes (i.e., conjunctions of literals) are monotonic. Not all
monotonic formulas are, however, cubes: disjunctions of literals, which were used to
construct Example 1, are monotonic but are not cubes in general. Again, Example 2
provides a good example of formulas which are not monotonic in the above sense.
We have shown (Proposition 4) that when goals are cubes, every truthful strategy in
a constant aggregation game is weakly dominant. Although this fails to be true when
goals are monotonic (Example 1 offers a counterexample to such claim), we can still
establish the following weaker result:
Lemma 14. Let A be a constant aggregation game with monotonic goals for an in-
dependent and monotonic rule F . Then, for each player i ∈ N there exists a truthful
strategy that is weakly dominant in A.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Recall Definition 3. We build a ballot B such
that B |= γi and show that for any ballot B′ 6= B and profile B, we have that if
F (B−i, B
′
i) |= γi then F (B−i, Bi) |= γi. Consider a ballot B′′ such that B′′ |= γi
(such ballot exists as we assume goals to be consistent). Now build the ballot B as
follows. For any issue pj , let:
B(j) =


1 if γi is positively monotonic in j
0 if γi is negatively monotonic in j
B′′(j) otherwise
By the assumption of monotonicity of γi the above construction guarantees that B |=
γi. We now show that for any B′ 6= B we have that if F (B−i, B′i) |= γi then
F (B−i, Bi) |= γi as well, for any ballot profile B, thereby establishing the claim.
So take such a ballot B′ and assume that F (B−i, B′) |= γi. Now let n be the Ham-
ming distance23 between B′ and B and consider the sequence B′ = B0, . . . , Bn = B
23We recall that the hamming distance H(B,B′) between two valuations (vectors) B and B′ is defined
as follows: H(B,B′) =
∑
j |B(j)−B
′(j)|.
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such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, Bk+1 is equal to Bk except for the value of one of the
issues (that is, the sequence consisting of a minimal number of value swaps to turn B′
intoB). By construction ofB, eachBk is the result of swaps 0 7→ 1 for issues in which
γi is positively monotonic, and 1 7→ 0 for issues in which γi is negatively monotonic,
and possibly other swaps on variables not occurring in γi.
We now prove that F (B−i, Bk) |= γi for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n. We proceed by induction
over k. For k = 0 the claim is true by assumption. Assume the claim is true for
k (IH), i.e., F (B−i, Bk) |= γi. By the observation above, Bk+1 can be obtained
from Bk in only two ways: a by a swap 0 7→ 1 for some issue j in which γi is
positively monotonic; or b by a swap 1 7→ 0 for some issue j in which γi is negatively
monotonic. If a is the case then in profile (B−i, Bk+1) there is one more voter,
namely i, who supports pj . We distiguish two cases:
a1 If F (B−i, Bk) |= pj , by independence and monotonicity of F , we can infer that
also F (B−i, Bk+1) |= pj and therefore F (B−i, Bk+1) = F (B−i, Bk) |= γi
by IH.
a2 If F (B−i, Bk) 6|= pj , then either i is not pivotal on issue j, and therefore
F (B−i, B
k+1) = F (B−i, B
k) |= γi by IH. Or i is pivotal at step k, and
then F (B−i, Bk+1) |= pj . We now need to observe that by the assumption
we have that γi is positively monotonic in pj to conclude that, also in this case,
maj(B−i, B
k+1) |= γi.
This proves the claim for the first case. If b is the case, we reason in a symmetric
fashion to conclude that that F (B−i, B) |= γi, as claimed.
A direct consequence of Lemma 14 is the existence of a truthful NE in weakly
dominant strategies for constant aggregation games with monotonic goals. However,
in order to obtain results analogous to Theorem 11 in the context of monotonic goals
we need first to establish sufficient conditions for the existence of truthful and efficient
NE.
Let us first introduce some auxiliary terminology. Two monotonic goals γ1 and γ2
are aligned if they are positively monotonic on the same set of issues and negatively
monotonic on the same set of issues. We establish the following result:
Lemma 15. Let A be a constant aggregation game with monotonic goals, for an inde-
pendent and monotonic aggregator F . Assume moreover that A is C-consistent, that
C ∈ W∧Γ where Γ = {γi | i ∈ C}, and that all goals of agents i ∈ C are aligned.
Then, A has a truthful and C-efficient NE (in weakly dominant strategies).
Proof. Let B′′ be a ballot such that B′′ |= ∧i∈C γi. B′′ exists by assumption of C-
consistency. B′′ can be used in the proof of Lemma 14 to construct a truthful NE
in weakly dominant strategies. Now observe that, since all goals of agents in C are
aligned, the weakly dominant equilibrium so constructed is composed by a unanimous
ballot choice for individuals in C, which we shall call B∗. Since C is a winning
coalition for
∧
i∈C γi, we have that F (B) |=
∧
i∈C γi and the equilibrium is therefore
also C-efficient as claimed.
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Everything is now in place to prove a variant of Theorem 11 for constant aggrega-
tion games where players hold monotonic goals.
Theorem 16. Let A be an N -consistent aggregation game with monotonic goals, for
an independent and monotonic aggregator F . Assume that all individual goals are
aligned, and that N ∈ W∧Γ for Γ = {γi | i ∈ N}. Then, there exists an N -truthful
and N -efficient NE of A which is also a SNE of A.
Sketch of proof. Let B be an N -truthful and N -efficient NE of A, which exists by
Lemma 15. We can therefore construct a transfer profile τ such that B is a weakly
dominant strategy equilibrium of τ(AT ). The construction proceeds in the same way
as the construction, for a transfer profile of the same type, given in the proof of Lemma
10. We then have to show that B is a SNE of AT . To do so we proceed towards a
contradiction and suppose that there exists a profitable deviation τ∗i for some player
i in AT . The argument used in the proof of Theorem 11 to the effect that no such
profitable deviation exists can be applied directly, thereby establishing the claim.
The assumption of monotonicity cannot be further weakened. If goals are allowed
to be non-monotonic, then it is possible to construct (constant) aggregation games
where, for some player, no truthful strategy is weakly dominant as witnessed by Ex-
ample 1.
5.2 Arbitrary Goals
As a final generalisation of our results, we consider the question of whether pre-vote
negotiations can support some good equilibria once we lift any restriction on the logical
structures of players’ goals. We answer this question positively, but only at the cost of
restricting the result to a specific aggregator, issue-wise majority.
Theorem 17. Let A be a uniform N -consistent aggregation game for maj with arbi-
trary goals in LPS. There exists a N -efficient and N -truthful NE of A that is a SNE of
A.
Proof. Let B be a N -efficient and N -truthful NE of A such Bi = Bj = B for each
i, j ∈ N where B |=
∧
i∈N γi. We construct a transfer function τ such that (τ,B) is a
solution outcome ofAT . Such equilibrium exists by the assumption of N -consistency.
Let M be as in (5). For all i, j ∈ N , let τi(B′, j) = 2Mx, wheneverB′j 6= B, where x
is the Hamming Distance of ballot B′j w.r.t. B, and τi(B
′, j) = 0, whenever B′i = B.
In words, each player i is committing to pay to the other players the quantity 2xM ,
with x increasing the further i’s ballot is from B. We show that (τ,B) is a solution
outcome of AT . Suppose towards a contradiction that this is not the case, that is, that
there exists a profitable deviation by player i from the strategy profile that induces the
transfer-ballot profile (τ,B). Since B is a NE in τ(A) such deviation has to involve a
different transfer τ∗i by player i in the pre-vote phase. We identify two cases:
Case 1 The game τ ′(A), where τ ′ = (τ∗i , τ−i), has no associated NE. We reason
exactly like in Case 1 of the proof of Theorem 11. The argument shows that for every
ballot profile B′ in τ ′(A), where τ ′ = (τ∗i , τi) i’s payoff is at most as much as what it
obtains from B in τ(A) and, therefore, that the deviation to τ∗i is not profitable.
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Case 2 The game τ ′(A), where τ ′ = (τ∗i , τ−i), has a NE. Since the strategy
profile supporting (τ,B) in AT is assumed to be a solution, i’s deviation determines
a transfer-ballot profile (τ ′,B′) where B′ may or may not be a NE. However, if i’s
deviation toward (τ ′,B′), where B′ is not a NE, is profitable, i must have another
at least as profitable deviation determining the transfer-ballot profile (τ ′, (B∗i ,B
′)),
where (B∗i ,B
′) is a NE of τ ′(A). We therefore assume w.l.o.g., that the transfer-ballot
profile (τ ′,B′) determined by i’s deviation is such that B′ is a NE of τ(A). Observe
now that in order for (τ ′,B′) to be profitable for i there must exist a j 6= i such
that B′j 6= Bj . That is, there exists at least another agent j besides i who deviates
from Bj = B in B′. This is because B is a N -efficient NE by assumption and by
construction of τ ′, we have that τ ′j(B
′, i) = 0 whenever B′j = B. So let there be
k ≥ 1 players j 6= i for which B′j 6= B. Notice also that k > n2 else maj(B
′) = B.
Consider now some such j. We have three sub-cases:
Case 2a There is a j ∈ N such that j 6= i, B′j 6= Bj and maj(B
′) 6|= γj . Since
B
′ is a NE, we have that no B′′j is such that maj(B′′j ,B
′
−j) |= γj , so B
′
j is a best
response only by virtue of j’s payoff. W.l.o.g. we can assume that the Hamming
distance between B′j and B is 1, that is, all voters are voting as close as possible to
B, therefore incurring the lowest possible non-0 transfers towards the other voters. We
can now reason exactly like in Case 2a of the proof of Theorem 11 concluding that the
constructed deviation τ∗ cannot be profitable.
Case 2b There is a j ∈ N such that j 6= i, B′j 6= Bj , maj(B
′) |= γj and for
which there is B◦j , with H(B,B◦j ) < H(B,B′j), such that: maj(B◦j ,B
′
−j) |= γj .
Ballot B′j is therefore a best response for j only by virtue of her payoff. The argument
used in 2a of the proof of Theorem 11 applies again to establish that τ ′(π)i(B′) ≤
τ(π)i(B), and therefore that the constructed deviation τ∗i cannot be profitable.
Case 2c For all j ∈ N with j 6= i and such thatB′j 6= Bj we have that maj(B
′) |=
γj and there is no B◦j , with H(B,B◦j ) < H(B,B′j), such that F (B◦j ,B
′
−j) |= γj .
Consider now an arbitrary issue k. We have two cases. Either maj(B′)(k) = B(k) or
not. Case 2c(i) We have that maj(B′)(k) = B(k). But then, for each such j, it must
be the case that B′j(k) = Bj(k), because we have that maj(B
′) |= γj and there is no
B◦j , with H(B,B◦j ) < H(B,B′j), such that F (B◦j ,B
′
−j) |= γj and ballot B′j is there-
fore a best response for j only by virtue of her payoff, so the argument used for Case 2a
of the proof of Theorem 11 can be applied. Case 2c(ii) We have that maj(B′)(k) 6=
B(k). Consider some j 6= i for whichB′j(k) 6= B(k), which exists by the assumptions.
Again by the assumptions above we have that j cannot choose ballot B+, such that
B′j(k
′) = B+j (k
′), for each k′ 6= k and B+j (k) = Bj(k), without compromising her
goal. This means that in B′, j is pivotal for k, i.e., maj(B+j ,B
′
−j)(k) = B(k). Also
notice that, being k arbitrary, this is true for each issue k such thatB′j(k) 6= Bj(k). But,
because of case 2c(i), this means that maj(B+j ,B′−j) = maj(B) and maj(B) |= γj .
However this contradicts the assumptions behind Case 2c, showing that 2c(ii) is im-
possible. But then, given the reasoning in Case 2c(i), it must be the case that B = B′,
contradicting the assumptions, and therefore showing that 2c altogether is impossible.
We conclude that in all cases the constructed deviation τ∗i is not profitable, thereby
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establishing the claim.
Let us comment on the above result in the light of the findings of this section. While
Theorems 11 and 13 showed that with cubes pre-vote negotiations exactly sustain the
set of good equilibria, weakening the constraints imposed on players’ goals reduces this
set significantly. Theorem 16 shows that when goals are monotonic at least one good
Nash equilibrium survives, provided the aggregator is independent and monotonic and
the game constant. Theorem 17 shows instead that if we restrict ourselves to issue-wise
majority, we do not need any restriction on players’ goals in order for at least one good
Nash equilibrium to survive. All in all, in specific classes of aggregators, although pre-
vote negotiations cannot sustain all good equilibria, they can sustain some, even when
removing any logical constraint on players’ goals.
6 Discussion & Related Work
In this section we discuss our results from two points of view. First, we sketch how
our results can be applied to the preservation of logical consistency when aggregation
occurs on logically interconnected issues, which is the key problem of judgment ag-
gregation. Second, we relate aggregation games to the influential notion of boolean
game.
6.1 Pre-vote Negotiations and Collective Consistency
We showcase an application of endogenous aggregation games to binary aggregation
with constraints, or judgment aggregation (Endriss, 2016; Grossi and Pigozzi, 2014),
where individual ballots need to satisfy a logical formula, the integrity constraint, in to
be considered feasible or admissible. In case each individual provides an admissible
ballot, the obvious question is whether the outcome of a given aggregation rule will be
admissible, as well. Here is an instance of this problem.
Example 4. Consider the scenario in Table 1. Suppose we impose the integrity con-
straint p → (q ∨ r), making ballot (1, 0, 0) inadmissible. All individual ballots in the
example satisfy this requirement but the majority ballot does not.
Paradoxical situations as those in Example 4 can be viewed as undesirable out-
comes of aggregation games. Building on the example, assume that each agent to have
the following goals: γ′A = p, γ′B = q, γ′C = ¬r. Let πA = πB = πC be constant pay-
off functions. Observe that parties’ goals are all consistent with the integrity constraint
r → (p ∨ q), and that the admissible ballot (1, 1, 0) satisfies all of them. Given these
goals, the profile in Table 1 shows a truthful NE that, however, does not satisfy neither
the goal of party B nor the integrity constraint p→ (q ∨ r). However, this equilibrium
is not surviving because, intuitively, party B could transfer enough utility to party C
for it to vote for q.
But the key question is whether we can guarantee that inadmissible equilibria do
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not survive.24 It is easy to see that if the integrity constraint is implied by some player’s
goal—intuitively, the player internalises consistency itself as a goal—then N -truthful
and N -efficient equilibria will satisfy the integrity constraint and, by our results, they
will be surviving in games with well-behaved aggregators (Theorem 11). Vice versa,
since only equilibria survive which are efficient for some winning coalition, with some
extra assumptions on the aggregator (Theorem 13), only collectively consistent out-
comes are generated by the aggregation.
6.2 Boolean Games
Boolean games (Harrenstein et al., 2001) are a logic-based representation of strategic
interaction, where a set of individualsA = {1, 2, . . . ,m} is assigned control of a set of
propositional variablesP = {p1, p2, . . . , pk}. Specifically, propositions are partitioned
among the agents, i.e., each agent is assigned unique control over a subset of them, and
each agent can decide to set the propositional variables he or she controls to true or
false, in such a way that the final outcome of the boolean game is determined by the
agents’ truth value assignment on the variables each of them controls. Finally, each
agent is equipped with a goal formula, i.e., a formula of propositional logic over the
set of variables P . Typically, although agents have control over some propositional
variables, they might not be able to realise their goal formula on their own.
Boolean games can be seen as a very basic form of aggregation games, as in Def-
inition 2. That is, a boolean game B, defined over A and PS, can be seen as an
aggregation game of the following form: AB =
〈
NB, IB, FB,
{
γBi
}
i∈N
,
{
πBi
}
i∈N
〉
where: NB = A is the set of players, IB = PS is the set of issues, FB is a dictatorship
on issue j by i, for any issue j ∈ I controlled by i ∈ N , i.e., FB(B)(j) = Bi(j), γBi
is the goal formula for i in B, and each πBi is constant. So a boolean game can be seen
as an aggregation game where each individual is a dictator for the variables he or she
controls. The goals are formulated on the outcome of the individuals’ assignments and
the payoff function plays no role, i.e., it is constant.
By the above reduction we are able to import the following complexity bounds
from the boolean games literature:
Proposition 18. LetA be an aggregation game with arbitrary goals γi for each i ∈ N
and B a ballot profile.
(1) The problem of verifying whether, for some transfer profile τ , B is a NE of τ(A)
is co-NP hard;
(2) The problem of verifying whether, for some transfer function τ and ballot profile
B
′ that is a Nash equilibrium of τ(A), we have that F (B′) |= ∧i∈N γi is Σ2p
hard;
(3) The problem of verifying whether, for some transfer function τ and all ballot
profiles B′ that are a Nash equilibrium of τ(A), we have thatF (B′) |= ∧i∈N γi
is Σ2p hard.
24That voting paradoxes can be studied from an equilibrium refinement perspective is an old but rather
underexplored idea (Gueth and Selten, 1991).
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Proof. The results follow from (Wooldridge et al., 2013, Proposition 1), (Wooldridge et al.,
2013, Proposition 6) and (Wooldridge et al., 2013, Proposition 14) respectively, to-
gether with the translation given above.
Boolean games have been extended in a number of ways, some of which will be
dealt with next. It is however worth mentioning the extension by (Gerbrandy, 2006) to
cooperative structures where coalitions are able to share the control of a propositional
variable. Although the purpose is to study the logical properties of shared control and
not the property of social choice functions, (Gerbrandy, 2006) basically works with
aggregation games with arbitrary aggregators, but without goals and without payoff
function.
Boolean games and incentive engineering A class of boolean games that is relevant
to our framework is boolean games with arbitrary payoffs, i.e., aggregation games of
the form AB =
〈
NB, IB, FB,
{
γBi
}
i∈N
,
{
πBi
}
i∈N
〉
where the payoff is not neces-
sarily constant. These boolean games have been introduced to account for efforts (or
costs) in performing actions (Grant et al., 2011; Wooldridge et al., 2013; Turrini, 2016;
Harrenstein et al., 2014). When comparing two outcomes, a player will prefer the ones
satisfying the goal, but will otherwise look at minimising the effort. This amounts to
the same idea of having a payoff that is taken into account only in case goal satisfaction
cannot discriminate between outcomes.
Boolean games with costs have been looked at from the point of view of incentive
engineering, allowing payoffs to be manipulable, either by exogenous taxation mecha-
nisms as in the work of (Wooldridge et al., 2013) and (Harrenstein et al., 2014), or by
endogenous negotiation as in the work of (Turrini, 2016). In the exogenous setting,
an external system designer can impose taxes on players’ actions, by effectively influ-
encing their decision-making towards the realisation of his or her own goal formula.
In the endogenous setting, individuals undergo a pre-play negotiation phase and try to
improve upon their final payoff using side-payments.
This has lead to the discovery of the existence of hard equilibria (Harrenstein et al.,
2014), i.e., pure Nash-equilibria that cannot be removed by external incentives. No-
tice that their presence is even more frequent in endogenous settings, due to the fact
that side-payments are a weaker form of manipulation than external intervention, as
observed by (Turrini, 2016). Endogenous boolean games are essentially endogenous
aggregation games applied to a more restricted secting. However the idea of hard equi-
librium does carry over to aggregation games in general. Think for instance of a situa-
tion in which there is only one issue, p, and only one winning coalition,N . If everyone
wants p to be true, then the profile in which everyone votes for p is an equilibrium that
is impossible to remove by manipulating payoffs.
7 Conclusions
The paper has proposed a model of pre-vote negotiation for games of binary aggrega-
tion. Although a number of papers in the literature on voting games have focused on
the problem of avoiding undesirable equilibria, no model studying strategic behaviour
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in a pre-vote negotiation phase has so far been proposed. We used the model to show
how pre-vote negotiations can restore the efficiency of truthful voting in such games.
More specifically we established the following main results. First, in uniform ag-
gregation games for independent and monotonic aggregators where voters’ goals are
cubes, if an equilibrium is truthful and efficient it will be selected by equilibrium be-
haviour in the pre-vote negotiation phase (Theorem 11). The ‘only if’ variant of this
claim holds with respect to the efficiency alone of the equilibria (Theorem 13). Sec-
ond, in constant aggregation games for independent and monotonic aggregators where
voters’ goals are monotonic and aligned, there always exist a truthful and efficient equi-
librium that will be selected by equilibrium behaviour in the pre-vote negotiation phase
(Theorem 16). Third, in uniform aggregation games for issue-wise majority, with arbi-
trary individual goals, there always exist a truthful and efficient equilibrium hat will be
selected by equilibrium behaviour in the pre-vote negotiation phase (Theorem 17).
Our work is a first step towards the development of a body of theoretical results on
how strategic interaction preceding voting influences the outcomes of group decision-
making.
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